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    Abstract 
For more than two decades, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been engaged in armed 
conflict against the government of Uganda. Under the leadership of Joseph Kony, the LRA is 
responsible for atrocities that include forced abduction; abuse of children and turning them 
into child soldiers; gruesome indiscriminate murders; mutilation; torture and rape of civilians; 
and looting and destruction of property. Over the last several years, the government of Uganda 
has pursued multiple strategies to end the war. In addition to military efforts, the government 
tried to engage the LRA in peace talks directed at ending the conflict. This presented the best 
chance to end the nation’s devastating civil war. With the LRA’s disregard of peace talks and 
continuous terrorizing of the population, the Ugandan government used its position of having 
ratified the Rome Statute to refer the crimes of the LRA to the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
The ICC prosecutor initiated an investigation and in July 2005 issued arrest warrants for Kony 
and four of his top commanders, two of whom are alleged to have since died. Recent 
developments indicate that the government of Uganda would prefer for the ICC to withdraw 
the arrest warrants if the accused agreed to undergo a tribal justice ritual that requires a public 
confession, and an apology without threat of incarceration. The Ugandan government would 
also favor a plan that supplements this traditional justice system with more formal court 
proceedings for those accused of the most serious crimes. In response, the rebels have said 
they will not engage in any peace negotiations, and they have singled out the ICC arrest 
warrants as the main reason and have called for their withdrawal. Situations from Sudan, The 




Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic are briefly analyzed for 
comparative purposes and to offer the reader a general insight into the ICC intervention in 
Africa. This study is to investigate the possibility that the ICC arrest warrants have interfered 
with the peace negotiations to end this civil war. 
CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND 
Uganda lies along the equator, between the great East African Rift Valleys. It is a land locked 
country, bordered by Sudan in the north, Kenya in the east, Tanzania in the south, Rwanda in 
the southwest and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the west. With a land mass of 241,139 
square kilometers, its population is about 30 million. Its territory includes Lake Victoria, Lake 
Albert, Lake Edward and Lake Kyoga. These lakes together with several elaborate networks of 
river drainage, constitute the head waters of the River Nile.  The country’s economy is primarily 
agrarian, comprising mostly of small holdings though pastoralism is dominant in Karamoja and 
Ankole regions. 
Lake Kyoga forms both a physical and linguistic marker. South of the Kyoga is the Bantu region, 
with the centralized pre-colonial states of Buganda, Toro, Ankole and Bunyoro the dominant 
territories. North and east of Kyoga are the non-Bantu territories of Acholi, Alur, Langi, Iteso 
and Karamojong. The Acholi inhabit present day northern Uganda and southern Sudan, where 
in the pre-colonial era, they constructed decentralized states. In the 1970s, the Acholi district of 
northern Uganda was divided into Gulu and Kitgum districts. In 2001, Kitgum was subdivided to 




create a third district of Pader. These three districts constitute an area commonly referred to as 
Acholiland. 
Acholiland has been in the grip of civil war since 1986. At the beginning of that year, the 
National Resistance Movement /Army (NRM/A) led by Museveni marched into Kampala and 
captured the capital. The defeated Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) that fought under 
Obote and Tito Okello was predominantly formed by northerners from Acholi and Langi ethnic 
groups. After Museveni took over, many UNLA soldiers fled towards their home areas in the 
north. Finding it hard to adjust to rural life, they choose to join rebel forces. Some of them 
regrouped in southern Sudan and formed the Uganda People’s Democratic Movement/Army 
(UPDM/A), one of the many rebel groups that have over the years carried on military 
campaigns against the government, the latest one of these being the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA). 
After the Uganda government had defeated UPDA, a woman called Alice Lakwena seized the 
opportunity to inspire many Acholi to join the Holy Spirit Movement with her as a leader. Her 
name Lakwena means “the messenger” in vernacular and she used this name tag to position 
herself as a spirit medium who claimed to have knowledge about the art of resistance during 
war. She believed that the Acholi could take over the government, and capitalized on deserting 
UPDA fighters using a combination of Christian beliefs and healing rituals. Her followers found 
in her a vehicle they could use to express their social discontentment. 




In November 1986, Lakwena and her group achieved two extraordinary victories against the 
NRA in southern Kitgum district taking the government by surprise. Her victory motivated many 
enthusiastic Acholi youth to join her. Eventually, they were defeated in November 1987. This 
was followed by negotiations between the UPDA and the government for the rebels to 
surrender and return to their communities. While most of them heeded this call, others were 
inspired afresh to form rebel groups, one of which was led by Lakwena’s alleged Cousin Joseph 
Kony and called itself the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRA).  
THE LORD’S RESISTANCE MOVEMENT HEADED BY JOSEPH KONY 
To start with, Kony had much in common with Lakwena. He too claimed to be a spirit medium, 
able to convey messages from spirits and perform healing and cleansing rituals. However, in 
1988, the nature of this movement turned dramatically when it started abducting children who 
soon formed a significant number of the rebel armed forces. Furthermore, the movement 
committed a number of atrocities against the Acholi people whose welfare they claimed to 
protect. These atrocities also include forced abduction, indiscriminate murder, mutilation, 
torture, and rape of civilians. 
 In particular, Kony and his forces have been condemned for the suffering they have inflicted on 
the children of northern Uganda. Children have been used as soldiers, porters, laborers and sex 
slaves. To be initiated into the rebel movement children have been required to undergo an 
initiation process that includes committing atrocities like killing and mutilation of people, as 
well as abducting other children. To avoid abduction, thousands of children had to resort to 




walking tens of miles from their villages to stay at centers run by non-government organizations 
and churches. 
Over the last several years, the government of Uganda has pursued multiple strategies of 
ending the war. One strategy was to militarily engage the rebels, this was translated into a 
never ending war that devastated northern Uganda to unimaginable proportions. The Ugandan 
government also sought to end the war by engaging the rebels in peace talks. This did not 
amount to much as the rebels did not show much commitment. When it looked like a solution 
was almost at hand the rebels would surprise the nation by committing more murders and 
abducting more children. 
As another strategy, the government passed legislation in 2000 offering blanket amnesty to any 
LRA member who agreed to surrender and renounce involvement with the rebellion. A seven-
member commission is responsible for the administration of the Statute. As of August 2010, 
12,481 former LRA rebels had reportedly received amnesty under the Act. 
UGANDA RATIFIES THE ROME STATUTE 
In June 2002, the Ugandan government ratified the Rome Statute allowing the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, acting on his own initiative or at the referral of a treaty party, 
to commence investigations and prosecutions of specified international crimes committed by 
Ugandan Citizens or on Ugandan soil after the treaty’s July 1, 2002 effective date. With 
atrocities continuing, Uganda formally referred the LRA’s crimes to the ICC in January 2004. The 




ICC prosecutor duly initiated an investigation and, in July 2005, procured arrest warrants for 
Joseph Kony and four of his top commanders, two of whom are alleged to have since died. 
Since the issuance of the arrest warrants the LRA have defied any efforts to engage in peace 
negotiations preferring that the ICC withdraws the warrants. In the summer of 2006, a peace 
agreement seemed within reach as the government of Southern Sudan began brokering talks in 
Juba, Sudan between the LRA and the Ugandan government. The Juba talks produced a 
unilateral ceasefire by the LRA followed by a truce agreement between the parties. After a 
temporary breakdown caused by the LRA’s withdrawal, negotiations resumed in 2007, with 
regional observers from Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, DR Congo, and South Africa 
participating. Every time a peace agreement has been seen within reach, the LRA have opted 
out prompting reports that the ICC is a major stumbling block as the LRA leadership insists on 
immunity from ICC prosecution. The issuance of the arrest warrants by the International 
Criminal Court brought in a new dimension to the conflict in northern Uganda. This subject is 
analyzed later as a center of focus. 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ROME STATUTE 
The ICC governed by the Rome Statute is the first permanent treaty based international 
criminal court established to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes 




of concern to the international community. It was set up to prosecute individuals for genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The court came into being on 1 July 2002 and can 
only prosecute crimes committed on or after that date. While it has its official seat in The 
Hague, Netherlands, its proceedings may take place anywhere. 
The reason for the creation of the ICC was an effort to fill the gap in the international legal 
system to enforce rules of individual accountability and ensure that acts of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes would not go unpunished. Having a legal personality, it has a 
legal capacity for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes as provided in 
the Rome Statute. The ICC is a court of last resort, meaning that the court will complement 
national judicial systems and will only assume jurisdiction after it determines that a national 
system is unwilling or unable to do so.  
Under the Rome Statute, the ICC will be composed of a Presidency, the Chambers that includes 
an appeals division, a trial division, and a pretrial division. It will also include the Office of the 
Prosecutor, and the Registry. On the court will seat eighteen judges elected by the Assembly of 
States Parties for non-renewable terms of nine years. The prosecutor and one or more deputy 
prosecutors will be elected in the same manner and under the same terms. 
JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY 
The Statute gives the Court jurisdiction over three core crimes – genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity committed by 
official or non-state actors in times of peace or armed conflict. Apart from acts recognized 




under the Nuremberg and Tokyo charters, and under the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the ICC is authorized to prosecute new crimes against 
humanity, including forced transfers of populations; severe deprivation of physical liberty, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution; forced pregnancy; persecution on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are universally recognized as 
impermissible under international law.  
Any state that becomes a party to the Rome Statute accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with 
respect to the above mentioned crimes. The court may also exercise its jurisdiction regarding a 
State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed 
on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft. Jurisdiction may 
also be exercised on the State of which the person accused of the crime is a national. 
A State Party may refer to the prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to 
investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons 
should be charged with the commission of such crimes. This referral should specify the relevant 
circumstances under which the crimes were committed and also be accompanied by supporting 
documentation. 
The prosecutor may then initiate investigations on the basis of information on crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The Prosecutor then analyses the information received, and may 
request for more information as necessary. Sources of this information may include States, 




organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or any 
other reliable appropriate sources. He may also receive written or oral testimony at the seat of 
the Court. 
If the Prosecutor is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, a 
request for authorization of an investigation may be submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber. Any 
supporting documents may also be submitted, and the victims may make representation to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber will authorize the commencement of the investigation only after examining the 
request and the supporting materials, and if they point to the fact that there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Court. 
Regarding admissibility, a case is inadmissible to the International Criminal Court if it is being 
prosecuted by a State that has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. A case will also be inadmissible to the 
Court if it has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State to genuinely prosecute. 
While the Court is supposed to satisfy that it has jurisdiction in a case brought before it, this 
jurisdiction may be challenged by the accused or a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear has been issued on reasonable grounds. A State which has jurisdiction may 




also challenge admissibility on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case. These 
challenges are to take place prior to or at the commencement of the trial. In exceptional 
circumstances, the court may grant leave for a challenge to be brought more than once or at a 
time later than the commencement of a trial. 
 The Court’s jurisdiction covers treaties and principles and rules of international law, including 
the established principles of the international law of armed conflict. General principles of law 
derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world may be included. The 
national law of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime as long as they 
are consistent with the Rome Statute and with international law and internationally recognized 
norms and standards may also be included. The Court may also apply principles and rules of law 
as interpreted in its previous decisions. The application and interpretation of law must be 
consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any distinction based 
on gender, age, race, color, language, religion, political opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
wealth, birth or other status. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
For a person to be criminally responsible, the conduct in question must constitute, at the time it 
takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the court. In case of ambiguity regarding the 
definition of a crime, the interpretation will be in favor of the person being investigated, 
prosecuted or convicted. A person will not be criminally responsible under the Rome Statute if 
he committed a crime before the Statute was enforced. People who are criminally responsible 




may include those who have committed the crime individually, jointly with another person or 
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible. Held 
responsible also is a person who solicits or induces the commission of a crime that occurs or is 
tempted. 
Regarding exclusion of jurisdiction, only people who were under 18 years of age at the time the 
alleged crime was committed may not fall under the Court’s jurisdiction. Otherwise this Statute 
is to apply equally to all persons regardless of their official capacity. Official capacity may be 
defined as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government of parliament, an 
elected representative or a government official. A person’s official status will not exempt them 
from criminal responsibility, and it will not be used by the Court to as a ground for reduction of 
a sentence. 
If one is a military commander or a person effectively acting as a military commander, they will 
criminally be held responsible for crimes committed by the forces under their command within 
the jurisdiction of the Court. Military commanders are in particular held responsible if they fail 
to exercise control over the actions of their forces. They should be in position to know if their 
forces are committing or about to commit crimes and take necessary and reasonable measures 
within their power to prevent it or submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. 




To decide whether a person is criminally responsible, the crime must have been committed 
with intent and knowledge. In this case intent means that the person wants and is willing to 
engage in the conduct, and is aware of the consequences. 
There are various reasons as to why a person may be excluded from criminal responsibility. 
These include a person who suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys his capacity 
to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his conduct. Excluded also is a person in a state of 
intoxication that destroys that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness nature of his 
crime. However, if a person has voluntarily intoxicated himself or herself, they will be held 
responsible for the crimes they commit under the influence within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
A mistake of fact is also ground for excluding criminal responsibility. 
If a person commits a crime under the order of a Government or of a superior, he will be held 
criminally responsible unless he was under legal obligation to obey the orders of his 
Government or his superior, and if he did not know that the order was unlawful. However, any 
orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful. 
COMPOSITION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE COURT 
The organs of the Court include the Presidency, an Appeal Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-
Trial Division. Included also is the Office of the Prosecutor, and The Registry. 
Judges are elected as full-time members of the Court and are to be available to serve on that 
basis from the commencement of their terms of office. Depending on the work load of the 




Court, the Presidency in consultation with the members may decide from time to time the 
extent to which the remaining judges may be required to serve on a full-time basis. 
There are to be 18 judges of the Court but the Presidency may propose an increase in a number 
of judges by indicating the reasons for the increase. Such a proposal would then be considered 
at a meeting of the assembly of State Parties. The proposal will be adopted if approved at the 
meeting by a vote of two thirds of the members of the Assembly of State Parties. It will enter 
into force at such a time as decided by the Assembly of State Parties. 
To be chosen as a judge of the Court, one must be a person of high moral character with 
impartiality and integrity. Such persons must possess qualifications that would enable them to 
be appointed to the highest judicial positions in their respective States. In addition, every 
candidate for election to the Court must have established competency in criminal law and 
procedure, and must have relevant experience whether as a judge, prosecutor, advocate or in 
other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings. Established competence in relevant areas of 
international law such as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights would be 
an added advantage. Every candidate for election is to have an excellent knowledge of and be 
fluent in at least one of the working languages of the Court. 
Judges of the Court are to be elected by secret ballot at the meeting of the Assembly of State 
Parties. The persons elected to the Court are those who obtain the highest number of votes and 
a two-thirds majority of the States Parties present and voting. No two judges may be nationals 




of the same State. Should a situation arise where a candidate has dual citizenship, the State 
where he or she exercises civil and political rights will be determined as the national State. 
In selecting judges of the Court, some important issues must be put into consideration. These 
include the representation of the legal system of the world, equitable geographical 
representation, and a fair representation of female and male judges. State Parties should also 
take into account the need to include judges with legal expertise on specific issues, including, 
but not limited to, violence against women or children. 
Judges have a task to elect the President and the First and Second Vice Presidents by absolute 
majority. They are to serve for a term of three years and are eligible for re-election once. The 
First Vice-President shall act in place of the President in the event that the President is 
unavailable or disqualified. Respectively, the Second Vice President shall act in the place of the 
President in the event that both the president and the First Vice President are unavailable or 
disqualified. The President, the First and Second Vice Presidents together have functions that 
includes the proper administration of the Court, with the exception of the Office of the 
Prosecutor. The President is to coordinate with and seek the concurrence of the Prosecutor on 
all matters of mutual concern. 
After the election of judges, the Court is to be organized into the Appeal Division, the Trial 
Division, and the Pre-trial Division. The assignment of judges to respective divisions is to be 
based on the nature of the functions to be performed by each division and the qualifications 
and experience of the judges elected to the Court. The assignment is to be made in such a way 




that each division will contain an appropriate combination of expertise in criminal law and 
procedure and in international law. Judges are to be independent in performing their tasks. 
They are not to engage in any activity likely to interfere with their judicial functions or affect 
confidence in their independence. While serving on a full-time basis at the seat of the Court, 
judges should not engage in any other occupation of a professional nature. 
The rules of procedure and evidence provide that a judge shall not participate in a case in which 
his or her impartiality is reasonable doubted. The Prosecutor or the person being investigated 
may request the disqualification of such a judge. Any issues as to the disqualification of the 
judge are to be decided by an absolute majority of the judges. While the challenged judge may 
present his or her comments on the matter, he will not take part in the decision. 
The Office of the Prosecutor is an important organ of the Court. It is responsible for receiving 
referrals and any substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The 
office also has a responsibility to conduct investigations and prosecutions from before the 
Court, and members of this office cannot seek or act on instructions from any external sources. 
The Office of the Prosecutor is to be headed by the Prosecutor who shall have full authority 
over the management and administration of the Office, including staff, and facilities. The 
Prosecutor may have one or more deputies to assist him in his work provided that they are of 
different nationalities. Both of them should serve on a full-term basis and should be persons of 
high moral character, be highly competent and have extensive practical experience in the 




prosecution or trial of criminal cases. They shall have an excellent knowledge and be affluent in 
at least one of the working languages of the Court. 
The election of the Prosecutor is by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the members of the 
Assembly of States Parties. The Deputy Prosecutor shall be elected in the same way from a list 
of candidates provided by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor shall nominate three candidates for 
each position of Deputy Prosecutor to be filled. Unless decided upon at election time, the 
Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutor shall hold office for a term of nine years and shall not be 
eligible for re-election. 
Both the Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutor cannot engage in any activity which is likely to 
interfere with his or her prosecutorial functions to compromise their independence. They 
cannot engage in any other occupation of professional nature. The Presidency may excuse the 
Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor, at his or her request from acting in a particular case. The 
Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutor are not to participate in any matter in which their 
impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground. The person being investigated or 
prosecuted may at any time request the disqualification of the Prosecutor on grounds that his 
or her impartiality is doubted. 
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION 
Having evaluated the information made available to him the Prosecutor shall initiate an 
investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed with the 
investigation. Before initiating an investigation, the prosecutor shall consider whether the 




information available to him provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed. 
In order to establish the truth, Prosecutor shall extend the investigation to cover all facts and 
evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility, and in doing so, 
investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally. The Prosecutor shall also take 
appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, respect the interests and personal circumstances 
of victims and witnesses, including age, gender, and health, and take into consideration the 
nature of the crime, in particular where it involves sexual violence, gender violence or violence 
against children. 
After collecting and examining evidence, the Prosecutor requests the presence of and question 
persons being investigated, victims and witnesses. The Prosecutor may also seek the 
cooperation of any State or intergovernmental organization or arrangement in accordance with 
its respective competence and mandate. Duties and powers of the Prosecutor also include 
entering into arrangements or agreements as may be necessary to facilitate the cooperation of 
a State, intergovernmental organization or person. The Prosecutor should agree not to disclose, 
at any stage of the proceedings, documents or information the he or she obtains on the 
condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless with 
the consent of the provider of that information. 




During an investigation, persons have a right not to be compelled to incriminate themselves or 
to confess guilt. They should also not be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, 
torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. If 
questioned in a language they he or she does not understand, a person should have access to a 
competent interpreter free of any cost, and the translation should meet the requirements of 
fairness. A person being investigated should also not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
detention, and should not be deprived of his or her liberty except on approved grounds and 
procedures. 
Even when there are grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, before being questioned, he has rights that are due to him or her. He 
or she should be informed, prior to being questioned that there are grounds to believe that he 
or she has committed a crime. The accused will also be informed of the specific charges against 
him or her. A person has a right to remain silent and this silence cannot be used as a 
consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence. A person also has a right to legal 
assistance, and to be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the person has voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel. 
THE ICC IS ACCUSED OF BEING BIASED 
In Uganda, the impartiality of the ICC has been questioned, the reason being that inquiries have 
all been directed at the LRA while the possible human rights abuses committed by the Ugandan 
Army (UDPF) have been ignored. As an explanation for this, Angelo Izama, on  October 16, 2005 




while reporting for The Monitor Uganda newspaper writes that the ICC prosecutor Moreno 
Ocampo is of the view that the Court’s focus is on the worst crimes and those are believed to 
have been committed by the LRA. The prosecutor said this in a statement while addressing 
journalists at The Hague on October 14, 2005. Another explanation is the fact that the 
discussion about the crimes of the Ugandan army are being ignored on the ground that it may 
lead to a “political debate”. 
The legitimacy of the Court no doubt depends on the ability of the prosecutor to maintain an 
appearance of impartiality, which seems a key issue in respect to the ICC involvement in 
Uganda. If the prosecutor becomes identified with any political agenda other than seeking 
justice, the role of the Court in providing an impartial independent forum for individuals 
accused of the most serious crimes will be severely compromised. The fact that the ICC only 
targets the LRA rebels is already a problem pointing to the fact that the Court is selective in its 
investigations and prosecutions rather than wanting to investigate and prosecute crimes across 
the board regardless of who committed them. 
What makes the prosecutor’s work difficult in the case of Uganda is that the ruling government 
is a party to the conflict that referred the crimes of the LRA rebels to the ICC. Northern Uganda 
being a war zone offers a complex situation. Even humanitarian workers have experienced 
difficulty gaining access to the local population. Sometimes they have resorted to negotiating 
with the rebels. The ICC investigators would have had to face similar challenges because their 
alternatives were limited they had to rely on the government of Uganda to provide them with 




the necessary security. Such a situation must play into how the investigators collect evidence 
and interrogate witnesses. It could also affect the principle of impartiality that the Court 
intends to uphold. 
 
THE ICC LACKS A MECHANISM TO ARREST SUSPECTS 
Questions of whose duty it is to actually arrest the LRA’s Kony and his top commanders has 
never been answered, as it is not the role of the ICC to arrest those it plans to try. The Ugandan 
Army (UPDF) it is assumed is the one to arrest Kony. Consideration should be put into the fact 
that even after employing a military strategy the Ugandan Army could not get these rebels. It 
seems unlikely that they will arrest them now and hand them over to the ICC. 
Another alternative for arresting the LRA top commanders would be for the prosecutorial team 
to rely on the UN peacekeeping forces for the enhanced security in carrying out the arrests. The 
use of the UN forces presents various problems, not only would doing so compromise the 
neutrality of the forces if they were perceived as part of the operation that is building a case 
against a party to the conflict, but also the relative independence of the ICC would be 
compromised. The intention of the Rome Statute was to strike a balance between allowing of 
input that may be acceptable from the Security Council and allowing the Court to operate 
independently. 




The fact that the LRA is largely made up of a population believed to have been child soldiers 
abducted from their families should present a dilemma to the ICC. Take for instance one of the 
LRA leaders who is wanted by the ICC was formerly a child soldier. Dominic Ongwen was 
abducted by the LRA when he was ten years of age, like all children abducted by the LRA he 
must have been brain washed and forced to commit atrocities against his community so that he 
became alienated from them. For Ongwen to face the same charges as Vincent Otti and Okot 
Odhiambo both of whom joined the rebellion as adults exposes the ICC as not having thought 
about certain situations that are unique to the conflict in northern Uganda.  
THE ICC AS A COURT EXCLUSIVELY FOR AFRICA 
The ICC has been criticized for focusing much of its attention exclusively on Africa. Some African 
leaders have joined Bashir of Sudan in implying that the court represents nothing more than 
the neo-imperialist justice of the west that keeps unfairly picking on Africa. 
During the last presidential elections in Sudan, Bashir exploited the ICC charges against him to 
pose as a hero of African nationalism. This shows that the ICC indictments can be counter-
productive, and rather than end impunity, they force offending leaders to cling to power. When 
it is not viewed as neo-colonialist or counter-productive, the court is seen by many Africans as 
simply ineffective. Since the Darfur crisis blew up, for instance, no one from the government 
side has been tried for the killings. Joseph Kony, the rebel leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army 
in northern Uganda is still at large. 




In its defense, the court does not impose itself on Africa. Of the five African situations being 
investigated, three were voluntarily referred to the ICC by the governments of Uganda, Congo, 
and the Central African Republic. The ICC was asked to investigate the situation in Sudan by the 
UN Security Council. In Kenya’s case, the ICC was brought in only with agreement of the 
country’s politicians after they had failed to agree on how to investigate the post-election 
violence of 2007. 
Besides, the ICC received overwhelming support from Africa. Thirty of Africa’s fifty three 
countries have signed up to the ICC. This is the largest continental block among signatory 
countries. Indeed, African governments sick and tired of genocide and crimes against humanity 
on the continent were enthusiastic about the set-up of an international criminal court. While 
the prosecutor of the ICC has encouraged self-referrals, such referrals have only been from 
African countries. Part of the reason for this could be the weakness of national legal systems of 
the individual countries since the ICC can only come in as a court of last resort after the national 
justice system has failed. Another opinion could be that the African continent is showing its 
commitment to international justice and their desire to end impunity. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
THE ICC ARREST WARRANTS ARE A STUMBLING BLOCK TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN 
UGANDA. 
The general attitude of the people of northern Uganda is that by issuing the arrest warrants the 
ICC interfered with the peace process. In his report called War and Justice in Northern Uganda, 




Tim Allen shares the view that the government of Uganda and the people of northern Uganda 
were committed to the peace process and feel that their efforts have been disregarded. From 
their point of view, the ICC involvement presents a serious threat (Allen, 2005:4). The LRA have 
repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the arrest warrants as a pre-condition to a final 
agreement. Take for instance, in February 2008, the Ugandan government and the LRA 
announced a “permanent ceasefire” agreement hailed by some as a major step toward a final 
peace settlement. However, in April, the LRA leader once again refused to appear for a 
scheduled signing ceremony until the ICC accepted the withdrawal of the outstanding arrest 
warrants (Greenawalt, 2007:116). 
In his article Accountability for Non-State Actors in Uganda, Manisuli SSenyonjo maintains that 
the ICC’s efforts to attain justice through prosecution while peace still eludes the region risks 
achieving neither justice nor peace. It is also acknowledged that since almost 80% of the LRA’s 
soldiers are children who have been abducted from their families and forced to commit 
atrocities, the ICC faces difficulty in categorizing the members of the LRA as victims or 
perpetrators who should be punished (Ssenyonjo, 2005:422). 
Leaders of the victimized Acholi community spoke up against the Court’s investigation and 
lobbied the ICC prosecutor to stop his work for fear it would subvert the ongoing peace process. 
With progression of negotiations with the LRA, the Ugandan government suggested that the 
Court should rescind its arrest warrants and promised to protect the LRA if the indictments 
remained. The ICC is prioritizing prosecution over victim autonomy not being mindful that 




although prosecution policies may provide some measure of deterrence, individual victims may 
remain vulnerable. 
THE ICC TAKES SIDES WITH THE GOVERNMENT 
Sriram Chandra discusses that the ICC Prosecutor is under pressure for announcing the 
intention to investigate crimes of the LRA while standing next to the Ugandan President. This 
gave the impression that the investigation will be selective in favor of the government and the 
army. Having initiated investigations, the Office of the Prosecutor has since been criticized for 
interfering in the peace process by announcing indictments against Kony and others as peace 
talks were revived between the LRA and the government (Sriram, 2007:8). 
Chandra argues that the ICC intervention in Uganda has been universally biased and has further 
jeopardized the safety of already threatened groups. It has also devalued the traditional judicial 
practices. The ICC is considered to be biased because the Ugandan government which referred 
the crimes of the LRA is not being investigated. It is well known that government forces also 
committed crimes against humanity during the conflict.  
The ICC Chief Prosecutor gave an impression that the Court was more mindful about the crimes 
of the LRA while not interested in those committed by government forces. As reported by Tim 
Allen, this picture was portrayed in the 2004 joint press conference with the Chief Prosecutor. 
When this move was criticized, Moreno Ocampo the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC attempted in 
vain to clarify that the government of Uganda will not be void of accountability (Allen, 2005:45). 




Angelo Izama, who is also a reporter for The Monitor Uganda is of the view that the ICC did not 
consider the totality of the situation. In his article, “Rethinking the Political Strategy of the 
International Criminal Court,” he maintains that it is hard for the victims of the conflict in 
Uganda to trust the ICC because it made a decision to indict the LRA without addressing the 
history of violence in the region. By doing this, it has failed to bring peace but enabled the 
silence of victims (Izama, 2009:56). 
 
THE PRESIDENT’S USE OF THE ICC AS A POLITICAL STRATEGY 
The referral of the crimes of the LRA by the Ugandan President is viewed as a political strategy. 
Issaka Souare writes that President Museveni is concerned about maintaining political power. 
However, the fact that he has held on to power for too long and having dictatorial tendencies 
has invited concern and criticism. The reason he originally encouraged the ICC intervention in 
Uganda could have been for the purpose of distancing himself from the conflict and protecting 
his international image (Souare, 2009:377). 
According to Sriram Chandra, the Prosecutor is criticized for accepting a referral that was 
crafted in a way that excludes the possibility of prosecuting any person other than those who 
had committed crimes in northern Uganda, specifically members of the LRA. In his defense, the 
Prosecutor asserted that he is not constrained by the referral and can investigate crimes 
committed by the Ugandan army as well. However, those investigations have not proceeded, at 
least not publicly, indicted have only been members of the LRA (Sriram, 2008:10) 




International Aid organizations and local organizations voiced their concern about the ICC 
involvement being an interference in the peace process. Save the Children, for instance, raised 
questions about the protection of children regarding the timing of the investigations and 
eventual prosecution. They were concerned about how the possible arrest and prosecution of 
the LRA leadership will affect the rights of the children still in captivity as well as those still in 
the local community. The war in northern Uganda primarily involves children, thus any action 
taken must seriously consider the impact it will have on child protection. 
Leaders of the Acholi community raised concern about the intervention of the ICC. Their 
reasoning was that the arrest warrants would practically close the path to peaceful negotiations 
as a channel to end the war. Adam Branch in “Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of 
Intervention” also states that the progress that has already been made in the peace process 
would also be rendered useless. The peace process would be interfered with because the rebels 
cannot come to the negotiating table while knowing that they are subject to be prosecution 
(Branch, 2004:21). 
When in 2007 the LRA rebels failed to assemble in the designated places to engage in the peace 
talks, they cited as the main reason the ICC arrest warrants. They demanded that the arrest 
warrants be first withdrawn before a comprehensive peace agreement is signed. Vincent Otti 
who was one of the indicted top LRA commanders said “the rebels will not sign any peace deal 
until the noose around their necks is loosened by the withdrawal of the arrest warrants (The 
Daily Monitor, October 2007). 




While reporting for the Monitor newspaper, Angelo Izama highlights the fact that when the 
issue of the arrest warrants was debated in the Uganda parliament, the majority of the 
members who hail from northern Uganda were of the view that the ICC should step back 
(Uganda Parliament, 7 September 2006). They argued that the traditional justice initiatives 
should be supported to deal with the problem. 
Soon after he referred the crimes of the LRA to the ICC, the Ugandan President asked the ICC to 
drop the charges. The government asserted that traditional justice would be an effective tool 
for dealing with most of the crimes with a special chamber in Uganda’s High Court being utilized 
for the leaders of the LRA. However, under the Rome Statute, there is no way for a government 
to withdraw a request. Tom Ginsburg talks about the LRA arrest warrants having created what 
is believed by many Ugandans as a barrier to the conclusion of a peace deal (Ginsburg 2008:9). 
Even though there is a promise of amnesty in Uganda to the rebels, its credibility is a subject for 
debate. This is because the operative decisions to prosecute are no longer under the control of 
the government. With lack of control, the potential of the government to bargain for peace is 
reduced. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE ICC 
KENYA 
On 15 December 2010, the international criminal court prosecutor announced that he would 
seek summonses for six people related to the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007. This 




violence followed a presidential election that was widely perceived as rigged in favor of the 
incumbent president Mwai Kibaki.  
Classified as one of the worst violent periods of the nation’s history, the post-election violence 
left more than 1,000 people dead, 3,500 injured and up to 600,000 forcibly displaced. During 
the 60 days of violence, there were hundreds of rapes and massive destruction of property in 
six of Kenya’s eight provinces. 
The six suspects are all high profile individuals that were allies of President Mwai Kibaki and his 
election rival Raila Odinga, the current Prime Minister. They are Uhuru Kenyatta, the Deputy 
Prime Minister, William Ruto, Higher Education Minister, Francis Muthoura, head of the Civil 
Service, and former Police Chief Mohammed Hussein Ali. 
Locally, there have been efforts to save these high profile politicians from going to The Hague 
with promises that justice will be pursued domestically. The Kenyan government has been 
trying to seek for international support for the trials to be deferred. The African Union also 
endorsed Kenya’s request to delay the ICC trial. 
The ICC involvement in Kenya raises concerns of how to ensure justice for victims of the 
electoral violence without upsetting the government’s fragile power-sharing agreement. An 
official investigation into the post-election violence known as the Waki Commission identified 
potential suspects and recommended the establishment of an independent Kenyan tribunal 
with international participation. In December 2008, the government accepted the Waki 




Commission’s findings and agreed that it would refer the situation to the ICC if the 
Commission’s recommendations were not implemented. 
Donors including the United States and the European Union expressed support for an 
independent domestic tribunal, and the Kenyan parliament was expected to pass legislation by 
March 2009. In July 2009, however, legislation had yet to be passed, prompting chief mediator 
Koffi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General, to submit to the ICC a list of individuals 
suspected of orchestrating the violence. 
The Kenyan government pledged to cooperate with the ICC, although some observers have 
expressed concern that senior officials could interfere with the investigations. Some Kenyans 
are concerned that prosecution could stir up the same ethnic tensions that led to the post-
election turmoil, while others fear that a lack of prosecutions could lead to future electoral 
violence. Other concerns center around the protection of witnesses and victims, who have 
already reportedly been subjected to intimidation and threats. Overall, the majority of Kenyans 
support ICC prosecutions in Kenya. 
MOST RECENTLY 
Top Kenyan politicians accused of instigating violence after the disputed 2007 presidential 
elections took to the stand at the International Criminal Court on April 7, 2011 in a preliminary 
appearance. They will return to the court on September 1, 2011 to begin the confirmation of 
charges hearing. The judge indicated that this could be varied if there were good grounds. 




Earlier, on April 18, the court will sit to determine the documents and evidence the prosecutor 
has presented. 
The accused are suspended cabinet ministers William Ruto and Henry Kosgey, broadcaster 
Joshua Sang, Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, Civil Service Head Francis Muthura, and 
Post Master General Hussein Ali. Judge Ekaterina Trendafilora from Belgium, the presiding 
Judge warned against the emergency of “dangerous speech” as depicted by the media. This 
could construe a breach of the conditions for the summons and trigger issuing of arrest 
warrants. 
LIBYA 
The ICC has opened its official investigation into possible crimes against humanity being 
committed in Libya. The ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo has warned those in 
power including Colonel Moammar Gadhafi, his sons and his inner circle that they could face 
prosecution if they commit crimes or fail to prevent them. On March 06, 2011, The Guardian 
reported Ocampo having said “we are witnessing a new situation where the world is united” 
Ocampo said, “no one can attack civilians, no one has authority to attack and massacre 
civilians”. The specific allegations the prosecutor is investigating are attacks by security forces 
on peaceful demonstrators that could amount to a crime against humanity. 
The investigation marks another step towards holding authoritarian leaders accountable for 
criminal activities. Like Sudan, the Libya situation was referred to the ICC by the UN Security 
Council. Libya is also not a signatory to the Rome Statute, meaning the Libyan government does 




not recognize the court’s authority. By the UN Security Council referring the situation to the ICC 
is an endorsement of jurisdiction over that situation. 
The ICC carried out a preliminary probe to establish if crimes falling within the jurisdiction of 
the court have been committed in Libya. That assessment includes the seriousness of the 
allegations and whether Colonel Ghadafi is likely to face justice in Libya. Following a preliminary 
examination of the available information, the prosecutor reached a conclusion that an 
investigation is warranted. 
The Libyan referral is an important test for the court. Previously, when the UN Security Council 
referred the Darfur situation to the ICC, the prosecutor took almost two years before laying 
charges. The people of Libya will expect something more immediate. They will not wait for two 
years for the wheels of justice to start turning. Even though Ghadafi is adamant and not 
humbled by the threat of prosecution, those in his inner circle will be. It is time for this court to 
inspire confidence in its ability to provide meaningful, significant and prompt response to the 
crisis. 
While the world welcomes this move on Libya by the ICC, there have been some conflicting 
opinions. Some believe that the prosecutor’s actions could have precisely the opposite effect of 
causing more violence and more atrocities. The wise thing would be to convince Ghadafi to step 
down and enable a safe transition for him into exile. When the ICC begins an investigation 
particularly before the outcome of a conflict is determined, it send a message that no matter 
what Ghadafi and his inner circle may choose to do, the world is after them. The likely 




consequence of this course of action is that he will hold on to power and fight until the last 
bullet as he has promised. So, the ICC’s move could lead to more atrocities and suffering for the 
people of Libya. 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE LRA POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY 
The LRA remains the least understood rebel movement in the world regarding its ideology. 
Apart from the LRA insisting that they intend to overthrow President Museveni’s government 
and replace it with one governed by the Biblical Ten Commandments little else is known of their 
philosophy. To the Ugandan army, the LRA is simply a criminal enterprise that employs terrorist 
tactics with no political agenda. 
The discussion over why the LRA terrorizes the Acholi peasantry is embedded in a broader 
controversy over the politics of the LRA. In discussion of the politics of guerrilla groups, two 
different questions are generally asked. First is whether a guerrilla group has a political agenda 
that motivates its war and use of violence. Second is whether its violence conforms to a political 
logic, that is if it can be understood as the means towards certain political ends of eliminating 
the enemy, establishing control over a population or even building support. The violence used 
would be transparently directed towards the realization of an explicit coherent political agenda. 
This does not seem to be the case with the LRA. 




While the LRA leadership has asserted that it is fighting for the creation of a government based 
upon the Ten Commandments, it has concentrated its violence not against the Uganda Peoples’ 
Defense Forces (UPDF) but rather against the Acholi people whose welfare they claim to be 
fighting for. While violence is a regular feature of relations between guerrilla groups and the 
civilians among whom they operate, in the case of the LRA few analysts have been willing to 
locate a political rationale in this anti-civilian violence. 
The Ugandan government has continuously portrayed the LRA as insane, the same assertion 
has been made by the international news media, and many non-governmental organizations. 
This has rendered the LRA as having no political agenda and as the latest manifestation of 
incomprehensible African violence. The LRA’s ultimate motivation may be located in external 
support. It has been used in the political wrangles between Uganda and Sudan. Having no 
political logic and its dedication to meaningless violence, has been a motivation for it to be 
simply an instrument for others. 
The LRA’s first operation outside of northern Uganda was into neighboring South Sudan. 
Beginning in 1994, the government of Sudan based in Khartoum provided military support and 
a safe haven to the LRA. In exchange, the Sudanese government used the LRA to destabilize 
South Sudan and fight the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA). In retaliation, the Ugandan 
government funded the SPLA. The U.S. government concerned about Khartoum’s involvement 
in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, also channeled weapons to the 
SPLA through the Ugandan government. The result was a massive flow of arms to the region. 




The 1999 Nairobi Agreement between Sudan and Uganda supposedly ended these cozy 
relationships. The LRA security in South Sudan became more uncertain after the SPLA and 
Sudanese government signed the comprehensive peace agreement in 2005. 
On the other hand, the LRA violence against Acholi civilians has some political logic. Anti-civilian 
violence can serve as a collective punishment, collective deterrence, or simply to stop the 
functioning of society and undermine faith in the government. In these cases the random 
nature of the violence is calculated to realize certain political effects. The LRA violence is 
sometimes random but more often it targets certain individuals who defect from the group, 
and suspected government informers. The violence is tailored to prevent communication that 
would be detrimental to the LRA. 
POLITICS OF THE UGANDA GOVERNMENT AND THE UPDF IN FIGHTING THE LRA 
The Uganda Peoples’ Defense Forces (UPDF) has been criticized for failing to protect the people 
of northern Uganda and end the war. Part of this is because the UPDF has been ill equipped to 
meet this challenge. The UPDF has been tainted by lack of capacity and training, poor morale, 
and involvement in the Congo. The UPDF has also been infiltrated by a number of corrupt 
officials who have profited from the on-going conflict. This reduces their motivation to see the 
war ending. The soldiers operate in severely ill equipped circumstances and yet some top UPDF 
officers have had “ghost soldiers” on the payroll and had the money diverted to their private 
accounts. 




The UPDF leadership for a long time blamed the Sudanese government for providing arms to 
the LRA and allowing them to establish bases in Southern Sudan. While the Sudan factor 
doubtlessly made the military campaign more difficult, the massive diversion of military 
resources and troops to the Congo and the permissive attitude towards corruption on the part 
the government has contributed to the persistence of the conflict. The government has also 
failed to undertake the military reforms necessary to more effectively fight the LRA. 
Others have gone further and attributed the government’s failure to end the war not to apathy 
but intention, to the fact that the government has been unwilling to end the war. Maintaining a 
contained war in the north it is argued serves the interests of various factions within the 
Ugandan government and the military, and consequently both the government and army have 
endured to prolong the war. 
The Ugandan government and UPDF have both political and economic interests in maintaining 
the conflict. Politically, many have argued that the government maintains the war to prevent 
political organization among the Acholi, who are perceived as a potential challenge to President 
Museveni’s hold on power. An explanation that holds much currency among Acholi political 
leaders and the Acholi in the diaspora is that the continuation of the war amounts to a slow 
genocide to eliminate the Acholi as a people. 
On the national level, it has been argued that the government maintains the war against the 
LRA so as to provide a crisis environment that enables the government to justify measures that 
would be unacceptable in different circumstances. Additionally, the presence of the LRA allows 




the government to silence political dissent in the name of counter-terrorism, thus disqualifying 
and subjecting political opposition to persecution. For instance, vocal Acholi Members of 
Parliament are regularly accused of being “friends of terrorists” by President Museveni himself 
and his associates. 
On the international level, the continuation of the war has provided the means through which 
President Museveni has re-invented himself especially in the wake of 9/11 as America’s key ally 
in the region. Museveni’s government has been the recipient of significant American military 
aid and diplomatic support for his own “war on terror” against the LRA in exchange for serving 
as a conduit to the SPLA in Southern Sudan. Additionally, Museveni has managed to dodge 
donor demands to reduce the military budget by citing the presence of the war in the north 
even when some of that foreign aid was at one point diverted to the Ugandan invasion and 
militarization of Eastern Congo. The donors for their part, not wanting to damage Uganda’s 
reputation as a “model of democracy and development” have conveniently ignored the conflict. 
In a context where beneficial effects of the war for various factions of the Ugandan government 
and military can be identified but difficult to prove, the war might best be thought of as a 
system. That is, military incompetence and corruption, the army’s economic interests, the 
government’s political interests, and American and European interests have converged to 
create a situation in which it is no one’s benefit to end the war. The continuation of the war 
either serves their purpose or at least leads to no significant change. 
 




UGANDA AND THE ROME STATUTE 
While it was Uganda itself that referred the LRA abuses to the Court, the Rome Statute does not 
provide guidelines regarding how referrals submitted by State Parties may be withdrawn. The 
international community has sided with the ICC and discouraged the removal of the arrest 
warrants on the grounds that the domestic justice system that Uganda prefers will not ensure 
adequate punishment for the crimes committed by the LRA. 
The ICC is also trying to prove a point that it will not be caught up within political wrangles of a 
State that will hinder its performance. Uganda’s President is being viewed as trying to 
manipulate the ICC. After signing the Rome Statute and referring the LRA crimes to the ICC, it 
seems controversial that he is now trying to offer amnesty to the rebels. 
Article 59 (1) (c) an ICC prosecutor deciding on the exercise of jurisdiction must consider 
whether “taking onto account the gravity of the crime and interests of the victims there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests 
of justice”. This discretional provision for jurisdiction seems to comply uneasily with existing 
principles of international law. The 1949 Geneva Convention widely recognized as embodying 
international common law created a binding obligation to prosecute such serious crimes as 
genocide and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, although only in the context of 
international armed conflict.  
The ICC works on a principle of complementarity in that the Court is supposed to complement 
national efforts. Article 17 of the Rome Statute states that the ICC must always refer to national 




proceedings unless a state is “unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation or 
prosecution”. An argument can thus be made that the amnesty program in Uganda should be 
given a chance since its primary purpose is addressing and resolving conflict rather than 
shielding a perpetrator from criminal responsibility. 
Frustrated with many unsuccessful strategies at defeating the LRA, President Museveni 
resorted to the ICC as another strategy to get the support of the international community and 
increase his chances of defeating the LRA. This was probably a ploy to use the ICC for political a 
purpose. The ICC seems to be aware of this strategy. For instance, (Greenawalt 2009, 29) writes 
that  Richard Goldstone, former chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, while speaking to an 
audience at the Centre for the Study of Human Rights London School of Economics objected 
that the ICC is not “a convenient hot water tap that can be turned on or off” and has 
condemned Ugandan President Museveni for acting in contravention of international law, 
meaning that his offers of amnesty to the LRA violates the letter of the law. The concern behind 
this is the fact that if the President of Uganda gets his way, it will be fatally damaging to the 
credibility of the international court. 
Article 53 provides that the prosecutor is to consider the interests of justice when deciding to 
begin investigations. There is little indication of what the interests of justice entails or how it 
interacts with what may be the more immediate concern of bringing an end to the conflict. The 
phrase “interests of justice” is a subject for debate pointing to whether the Acholi possess a 




special form of justice based more on reconciliation and healing, and whether this is being 
ignored by the ICC in favor of a more punitive model based on western concepts. 
Interests of justice invoked in article 53 can become a basis to block the ICC’s investigation or 
prosecution of a case. Basically, it is possible for the ICC to withdraw the arrest warrants for the 
interests of justice. If the prosecutor was to take into account the gravity of the crime and the 
interests of the victims, it is reasonable to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice. Even when an investigation has already taken place, the prosecutor, for the 
interests of justice may not proceed to a prosecution taking into consideration all the 
circumstances. 
THE GOVERNMENT USES THE CONFLICT TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE ABROAD 
The position of Uganda before referring the crimes of the LRA to the ICC needs to be analyzed. 
It is true that prior to that the Ugandan army had failed to defeat the LRA by military means. 
The referral was perceived as a new means to defeat them. On the other hand, with the 
deteriorating humanitarian situation in northern Uganda, with over one million displaced 
people, the scandals tied to the UPDF, and the classification of northern Uganda by the UN 
Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs as the “most forgotten and neglected crisis in 
the world,” the government was put on the spotlight as having a tarnished reputation. By 
referring the crimes of the LRA to the ICC a new face was put on the LRA as the international 
community was sensitized about the situation in northern Uganda. 




This worked for Uganda as both a military strategy and to bolster its international reputation, 
rather than out of a conviction about law and justice. The referral was to prove to the LRA that 
they were sought after by the whole international community and not only were they enemies 
of Uganda. The Ugandan government hoped that perhaps, the ICC with its international reach 
might do better than the Ugandan military. That was before it became clear to Uganda that 
enforcement is the weakest link in the ICC’s operations. 
With the branding of the LRA as evil, the Ugandan government was portrayed as a defender of 
the people, a legitimate government fighting a criminal movement. Criticism ceased to be put 
on the UPDF as all attention was directed at the LRA. The referral indeed put a nice face on the 
government of Uganda as the first State to refer a situation to the ICC, and therefore a 
champion of international justice. It is little wonder therefore that because of this good 
example on June 12, 2010, Kampala, Uganda’s capital was chosen to host the ICC Review 
Conference. 
Another way the referral played into Uganda’s advantage was that the Ugandan government 
was able to convince the Congolese government to allow the Ugandan army to pursue the LRA 
on its territory. When this operation took place, the UPDF helped displace hundreds of people 
while many lost their lives. Again, there was no criticism on the UPDF. The Security Council 
welcomed the joint efforts made by the States in the region to address the security threat 
posed by the LRA. 




From the beginning, the Office of the Prosecutor handled the conflict in northern Uganda in 
terms of friend and enemy relations by being on the side of the Ugandan government and the 
LRA being presented as the enemy. When announcing the referral, the Prosecutor presented 
the Ugandan government as its partner in combating international crimes. This pointed to the 
fact that the LRA and not the Ugandan government would be the subject of investigations. 
Indeed, no investigation has ever taken place targeting the UPDF, and according to newspaper 
reports in Uganda, the UPDF was cleared by the ICC of any wrong doing. Some Ugandans view 
with suspicion the absence of ICC proceedings against high ranking UPDF officers for crimes 
committed. 
The Office of the Prosecutor welcomed the referral by the Ugandan government without ever 
critically assessing the factors relevant to admissibility leaving some Ugandans with an 
impression that it acted because the Ugandan government wanted it to act. The only strain 
between the ICC and Uganda relationship came about when the Ugandan government began to 
consider conducting domestic proceedings as an alternative to the ICC in order to convince the 
LRA to sign a peace agreement.  
THE ICC IS UNDER PERFORMANCE PRESSURE 
The institutional interests of the ICC at the time Uganda referred the crimes of the LRA to the 
Court need to be analyzed. There must have been pressure for the ICC to prove that it is worth 
its creation and existence. The USA’s snob of the Court added to this pressure. The situation in 
Uganda was a perfect case, and the fact that it was referred by the State itself was an added 




advantage. All the States that ratified the Rome Statute were bound to respect State 
sovereignty and welcome the ICC’s investigation of the LRA. The USA had already put the LRA 
on its international terrorists list, so it was not likely to criticize the ICC’s involvement in this 
conflict. 
At the time of the referral, the Office of the Prosecutor could not envision the complexities that 
were later to arise out of the Ugandan situation. The task did not prove to be as easy as had 
earlier been anticipated. The relationship between the ICC and the Ugandan government got 
strained when their interests began to diverge. Uganda suddenly realized the inability of the ICC 
to arrest the LRA leadership. To make matters worse, the LRA also refused to sign a peace 
agreement for as long as the ICC was still involved. 
When the Ugandan government and the LRA agreed on domestic proceedings which could 
render ICC proceedings inadmissible in accordance with the Rome Statute’s principle of 
complementarity, the Prosecutor was willing to make sure it does not happen. In “Doing Justice 
to Political 2005, 56, Houwen writes that the prosecutor declared that his office would “fight 
any admissibility challenge in court”. When the Pre-Trial chamber learnt of Uganda’s plans for 
domestic proceedings as an alternative to the ICC, it decided on a way to initiate proceedings to 
assess complementarity with a purpose to show that it is the court to determine the 
admissibility of cases before the ICC and not individual States, in this particular case Uganda. 
 
 






The Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic will be briefly analyzed 
for comparison purposes and to give the reader an experience of the ICC’s work in Africa 
besides Uganda. It also gives an insight into how the ICC has handled these situations. These 
cases show that Africa is over-represented at the International Criminal Court in comparison 
with other regions. However, most African countries having ratified the Rome statute, and 
some of them being involved in conflict, are likely to fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
Darfur has experienced  a civil war since independence in 1956 that has become more complex 
over the years. Originally, it was a North – South battle over resources and political power, with 
elements that were religious and ethnic in nature, as the Arab and Muslim governments of the 
National Islamic Front (NIF) of Omar-al-Bashir fought against the rebel group and political party 
of the non-Arab and non-Moslem Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of the South. As the 
NIF and SPLA decided to enter into a peace deal in January 2005, the two rebel groups from the 
neglected non – Arab western region of Darfur attacked government sites in 2003 in protest of 
economic and political marginalization. 
The government responded brutally with both its military and Arab nomads called the 
Janjaweed. Horrific brutalities against the rebel groups and Darfurian civilians ensued and by 
2006 an estimated 200,000 had died and 2 million people were forced from their homes.  
According to the UN News Centre of March 14, 2004, Tom Eric Vraalsen, the United Nations’ 




special envoy to Sudan, called the crisis “the worst humanitarian crisis in the world”. The UN’s 
main action by the end of 2004 was to create an International commission of inquiry to 
investigate whether violations of international humanitarian law or genocide had occurred. The 
commission’s finding was that the systematic nature of the government’s attacks could be 
classified as crimes against humanity. 
The UN Security Council exercised its ability to refer cases to the international criminal court 
and referred the situation in Darfur to the court to address violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law, unlike the Ugandan situation that had a state referral. 
The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al-
Bashir for orchestrating a bloody campaign against Darfur’s three main ethnic groups. Unlike 
the Uganda situation, in this case the ICC is accusing a sitting head of state for committing the 
most horrible international crimes. Bashir is accused of the crime of targeted mass killing, 
causing of serious bodily or mental harm to members of a target group, and deliberately 
inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction. 
The indictment of a head of State raises issues of immunity, jurisdiction, and joint criminal 
responsibility. While Sudan is not a state party to the ICC, it is required to comply by virtue of 
the UN Security Council Resolution which referred the situation to the ICC’s Office of the 
Prosecutor. Bashir is being charged as an individual under Article 25 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute 
which criminalizes “indirect perpetrators or perpetration by means”. According to the 
prosecutor, the mobilization of the state machinery constitutes evidence of a plan by the 




President to destroy entire ethnic groups. The destructive intent is further evidenced by the 
fact that 2.7 million people who were displaced to camps are almost all members of three 
groups. The prosecutor also asserts that these displacements constitute genocide according to 
the Genocide Convention. 
As estimated by the Office of the Prosecutor, thirty-five thousand people were killed outright 
by the government machinery. It is also estimated that at least another hundred thousand died 
of starvation in displacement camps without any help from the government. Rape is cited as an 
integral part of the plan of destruction in the camps. 
The conflict in Darfur is compared to the one in Uganda in that in both situations it is people of 
a given ethnicity that are targeted. The LRA have committed crimes again that Acholi whose 
rights they pretend to be fighting for. Bashir is charged with three accounts of genocide by 
encouraging actions with intent to bring about the destruction of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa 
ethnic groups. Both conflicts have seen people sent into displacement camps where conditions 
are so severe that there has been massive loss of life. 
The difference is that while the Acholi in northern Uganda have had crimes committed against 
them by a rebel group, the people in Darfur have been persecuted by their own government. 
There are mixed feelings regarding the indictment of the Sudanese President. Many Darfurians 
are happy about it because they consider Bashir to be responsible for the destruction of the 
land and the death of thousands of people. They believe he deserves the condemnation he is 
receiving. The southerners join the people of Darfur in this delight. Some people however, 




consider that this indictment comes at the expense of justice just like in the northern Uganda 
situation. They assert that the timing is not right and could lead to further suffering of the 
people of Sudan. The political instability does not favor the involvement of the ICC. 
Critics of the ICC’s involvement in Uganda have raised concern about the fact that the ICC as an 
operation lacks the mechanism to have the indicted persons arrested. The same concern is 
attached to Sudan’s Bashir. Obviously, he will not surrender himself to the ICC, and some 
African governments have shown their unwillingness to cooperate with the ICC to have him 
arrested. In fact, he has been accorded protection for the purpose of defying arrest. The 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit that was scheduled to take place 
in Nairobi, Kenya was postponed and later moved to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This happened 
after the Kenyan government received a letter from the ICC calling for the arrest of Sudan’s 
Bashir if he turns up to attend the summit. Ethiopia does not recognize the ICC. 
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
THOMAS LUBANGA 
The Democratic Republic of Congo is analyzed to show that at least the ICC has been successful 
in arresting some of the offenders. For the five people that the ICC issued arrest warrants for, 
four have already been arrested and appeared at The Hague. 
Thomas Lubanga born is a former rebel leader from the Democratic Republic of Congo. He 
founded the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) and was a key player in the Ituri conflict. Under 




his command there were massive human rights violations including ethnic massacres, murder, 
torture, rape, mutilation, and forcibly conscripting child soldiers. 
Under Lubanga’s leadership, the largely Hema (UPC) became one of the main actors in the Ituri 
conflict between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. It seized control of Bunia, a gold rich Ituri 
region and demanded that the Congolese government recognize Ituri as an autonomous 
province. 
Human rights activists have accused the UPC under Lubanga’s command of ethnic massacres, 
murder, torture, rape and mutilation, as well as the recruitment of child soldiers. Between 
November 2002 and June 2003, the UPC is reported to have destroyed 26 villages in one area 
killing at least 350 people and forcing 60,000 to flee from their homes. Human rights 
organizations claim that at one point Lubanga had 3,000 child soldiers between the ages of 8 
and 15, he reportedly ordered every family to help the war effort by donating something; 
money, a cow, or a child to join the militia. 
In March 2004, the Congolese government authorized the International Criminal Court to 
investigate and prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of the court allegedly committed 
anywhere in the territory of the DRC since the entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1st July 
2002. On 10th February 2006, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC found that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that Lubanga bore individual criminal responsibility for the war crime of 
conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities, and issued a sealed warrant of his arrest. In March 2006, Lubanga became 




the first person to be arrested under an ICC arrest warrant when the Congolese authorities 
arrested him and transferred him into ICC custody. 
GERMAIN KATANGA AND MATHIEU NGUDJOLO 
In early 2003, Katanga emerged as the senior commander of the Patriotic Resistance Force in 
Ituri (FRPI), a militia group which was involved in the Ituri conflict. On 24 February, 2003, 
Katanga who hails from the Ituri province in the north-East of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo allegedly led an attack on the village of Bogoro in which rebels under his command went 
on an indiscriminate killing spree. At least two hundred civilian lost their lives, survivors were 
imprisoned in a room filled with corpses, and women and girls were used as sex slaves 
Alleged also is that in September 2002, Katanga helped lead other crimes that included the 
massacre of more than 1,200 civilians in an attack at Nyakunde Hospital. 
In early March 2005, Katanga was arrested by the Congolese authorities in connection with the 
killing of nine United Nations peacekeepers in Ituri on 25 February, 2005. In October 2007, he 
was transferred to the ICC where in July 2007 a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC found that there 
were reasonable grounds to believe that Katanga bore individual criminal responsibility for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Bogoro attack, and issued a sealed 
warrant for his arrest.  
He was charged with six counts of war crimes that include willful killing, inhuman treatment or 
cruel treatment, using children under the age of fifteen years to participate actively in 




hostilities, sexual slavery, intentionally directing attacks against civilians, and pillaging. He was 
also charged with three counts of crimes against humanity; murder, inhuman acts and sexual 
slavery. 
Katanga will be jointly tried with Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, another suspect who was surrendered 
to the ICC to face charges in relation to the Bogoro attack. Mathieu Ngudjolo was a colonel in 
the Congolese army and a former senior commander of the National Integration Front (FNI), 
and the Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri (FRPI).  
Ngudjolo was arrested by the Congolese authorities and surrendered to the International 
Criminal Court and is charged with the same crimes as Germain Katanga. On 24 February, 2003 
he allegedly led an attack on the village in Bogoro in which rebels under his command went on 
an indiscriminate killing spree. The rebels also sexually enslaved women and girls. Ngudjolo 
allegedly ordered his fighters to wipe out the village. 
Katanga and Ngudjolo commanded the FRPI and FNI militia groups respectively. They are 
alleged to have jointly committed numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity over a 
series of attacks against civilians. Although two individual arrest warrants were issued against 
them separately, the court’s trial chamber joined the cases on 11th March, 2008 because they 
were charged with similar accounts of crimes. 
Katanga filed a motion in February 2009 challenging the admissibility of his case by invoking the 
principle of complementarity to argue that he could be tried before Congolese courts. The Trial 
Chamber rejected his inadmissibility motion on the ground that the Democratic Republic of 




Congo courts are unable to investigate the Bogoro massacre. With the ongoing insecurity in 
Ituri and the time that had lapsed since the 2003 Bogoro massacre, the Congolese justice 
system was not able to conduct an effective inquiry and there was support for the ICC to 
continue with its case against Katanga.  
The ICC was still mindful of respecting the principle of complementarity that the court will only 
intervene when national legal systems are unable or unwilling to prosecute serious 
international crimes as prescribed by the Rome Statute. 
The controversy in the charges against Katanga and Ngudjolo is that the ICC’s charges against 
the two men do not reflect the extent of the crimes committed by the FRPI and the FNI, 
thereby showing the limitation of the court. The coalition rebel forces of the FRPI and FNI 
committed major mass atrocities against civilians. The ones documented by human rights 
reports include 5th September 2002 in Nyakunde, 6th March and 11th May 2003 in Bunia, 6th July 
2003 in Kasenyi, 31st May 2003 in Tchoma, 4th March 2003 in Mandro, and 19th September 2004 
in Lengabo. 
THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
The situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) was the third referral to be submitted to the 
prosecutor of the ICC by a state party, following referrals from Uganda and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. On 7 January, 2005 the prosecutor received a letter from the CAR 
government referring the situation of crimes within the jurisdiction of the court committed 
anywhere on the territory of the Central African Republic since 1 July, 2002. In response to this 




letter, the prosecutor announced that he was carrying out an analysis in order to determine 
whether to initiate an investigation. 
On 22 May 2007, the ICC prosecutor announced the opening of the investigation into grave 
crimes allegedly committed in the CAR with the peak of the violence occurring in 2002 and 
2003. The prosecutor’s announcement pointed to a focus on sexual violence referring to 
hundreds of victims narrating accounts of rape and other abuses committed with particular 
cruelty.  
JEAN-PIERRE BEMBA 
Jean-Pierre Bemba’s case is unique because while he is Congolese, he was arrested in 
connection with crimes he is alleged to have committed in another country, the Central African 
Republic. His is another case showing some success for the ICC because he has been arrested 
and appeared before the ICC. The ICC seems to be doing better in The Democratic Republic of 
Congo and The Central African Republic compared to Uganda. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba is the first suspect and first detainee in the CAR situation. He was a politician 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and he was a Vice President in the transitional 
government of the DRC from 17 July 2003 to December 2006. He was a leader of the 
Movement of the Liberation of Congo (MLC), a rebel group turned political party. In 2002, 
President Ange-Felix Patasse of the Central African Republic invited the MLC to come to his 
country and put down a coup attempt. Human rights activists accused the MLC fighters of 
committing atrocities against civilians in the course of this conflict. 




In March 2003, President of the Central African Republic was ousted, and the government that 
replaced him pressed for charges against Patesse and Bemba in September 2004. While Bemba 
was not specifically targeted, his indictment was still a result of the ICC investigation of crimes 
committed in CAR. 
On 23 May 2008, a Pre-Trial chamber of the ICC found that there were reasonable grounds to 
believe that Bemba bore individual criminal responsibility for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed in the CAR between 25 October and 15 March 2003, and issued a sealed 
warrant of his arrest. He was charged with five counts of war crimes (murder, rape, torture, 
pillaging, and outrages upon personal dignity), and three counts of crimes against humanity 
(murder, rape and torture). 
On May 24 2008, Bemba was arrested near Brussels. He was surrendered to the ICC on 3 July, 
2008 and transferred to its detention center in The Hague. He was the first person arrested in 
connection with the ICC’s investigation in the Central African Republic. 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE UGANDA TRADITIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
There has been a lot of focus on Uganda’s proposal to confront the crimes of the LRA by 
employing the traditional informal dispute resolution methods historically relied upon by 
Uganda’s various peoples to ensure justice at the local village level. Already, traditional 




measures have provided a method of integrating returning LRA members into their 
communities. Although traditional justice appears to enjoy some formal role within the 
Ugandan legal system as a general method of resolving cases referred by local courts, this 
justice system is however marked by the informality of the procedure employed, and by a focus 
on monetary compensation and reconciliation rather than more severe criminal sanctions. 
The most important aspects of the traditional justice in Acholi culture are the establishment of 
truth, the voluntary nature of the process particularly on the side of the offender, the payment 
of compensation to restore what was lost, and lastly, the restoration of social relations and 
unity of the family and clans. 
In Acholi culture, much attention is focused on a ritual known as mato oput which means 
drinking of the bitter root. The defining feature of this tradition is that it restores social 
harmony after a homicide through confessions, negotiated compensation, and reconciliation 
between the offender and the victim’s kin. 
In addition to the traditional justice system, the Ugandan authorities have repeatedly suggested 
that a comprehensive peace agreement would permit the specific LRA leaders sought by the 
ICC to undergo alternative justice procedures of some form or another without need for 
incarceration. That the LRA leaders would be required to confess to their crimes, apologize and 
become subject to certain sanctions such as payment of reparations and restrictions on their 
freedom of movement. Most of the Acholi people were in support of this solution. The 




Ugandan government justified its position by claiming that this is the course that the Acholi 
desire. 
AGREEMENT FOR THE LRA ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECONCILIATION 
The Ugandan authorities have publicly pledged that they would go to the ICC to seek 
withdrawal of charges on condition that the LRA leader would first surrender and undergo the 
mato oput ceremony. By contrast, the LRA continuously demanded the withdrawal of the 
charges as a pre-condition to a final agreement. Definitely, the Ugandan government cannot 
afford such condition without the cooperation of the ICC. 
This has caused peace negotiations to stall, and when there have been some breakthroughs the 
LRA have turned around and dismantled them by refusing to emerge and sign a peace 
agreement. After returning to the negotiating table, the Ugandan government and the LRA 
signed a June 2007 agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation dealing specifically with the 
question of accountability for serious crimes. 
While the agreement was trying to be in tune with the Rome Statute and in particular with the 
principle of complementarity, it raises more questions than it answers about the handling of 
the LRA crimes. The agreement proposes a number of methods to achieve the principles of 
accountability and reconciliation. It specifies that traditional justice mechanisms that include 
the mato oput will be shall be promoted with necessary modifications. In Complementarity in 
Crisis, page 108, Greenawalt states that the agreement provides that “formal criminal and civil 
justice measures shall be applied to any individual who is alleged to have committed serious 




crimes or human rights violations in the course of the conflict” and that those “alleged to bear 
particular responsibility for the most serious crimes, especially crimes amounting to 
international crimes” are subject to the jurisdiction of formal courts provided for under the 
Constitution. 
The above provisions seem to be abandoning the idea of using mato oput or some other form 
of traditional justice to try Kony and other suspects targeted by the ICC. This agreement on 
accountability and reconciliation is not equivalent to the use of formal courts with the 
imposition of typical criminal penalties. Instead it provides that “legislation shall introduce a 
regime of alternative penalties and sanctions which shall apply and replace existing penalties, 
with respect to serious crimes and human rights violations committed by non-state actors in 
the course of the conflict”( Greenawalt, 2009:18). 
The agreement offers no detail on what the content of these alternative penalties shall provide 
except that they shall, as relevant, reflect the gravity of the crimes or violations, promote 
reconciliation between individuals and within communities, promote the rehabilitation of 
offenders, take into account an individual’s admission or other cooperation with proceedings, 
and, require perpetrators to make reparations to victims. However, since the agreement, the 
Ugandan president has continued to endorse the idea of traditional justice or amnesty for the 
LRA. This raises questions as to whether the agreement is intended as a departure from these 
measures. 




In February 2008, the Ugandan government and the LRA executed a further annex to the June 
2007 agreement specifying, among other provisions, that trials of individuals accused of serious 
crimes shall be handled by a newly created special division of the High Court of Uganda. The 
annex also reaffirms the commitment to traditional justice including mato oput, and provides 
for the establishment of a government body charged with truth seeking and preservation of 
historical memory. 
Following this, there was a permanent cease-fire agreement that was viewed by many people 
as a step in the right direction toward a final peace settlement to the two-decade war. When 
April came, Kony again refused to appear for a scheduled signing ceremony citing the 
outstanding ICC arrest warrants. The same trend happened in November. Meanwhile the LRA 
continued to abduct children and terrorize the civilians. 
SUPPORT FOR THE TRADITIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
As earlier mentioned, there is massive support for the traditional justice system that would 
eventually enable the LRA rebels to be integrated back in the community. What is more 
important this support is echoed by the Acholi who are most affected by this conflict. 
Traditional justice is supported over the western system which emphasizes retributive 
approaches where punishment is aimed not at repairing the harm the offenders did to their 
victims nor at repairing their relationship to the victim and his community. The desire for 
retributive justice is a desire for vengeance, getting even, putting the world back in balance. 




Retributionists simply consider is morally fitting that criminal offenders are punished. This is the 
kind of justice that the ICC is seeking to implement in Northern Uganda. 
 Acholi traditional justice system emphasizes restoration and reconciliation. The traditional 
African sense of justice is not simply about applying retributive aspects of justice in isolation, as 
it is in the western model. There is need to have a system that is an overarching process that 
also encompasses rehabilitation, reconciliation, compensation and restoration (Refugee Law 
Project, 2005). 
Restorative justice sees greater value in educating and rehabilitating an offender than in simply 
incarcerating him and forgetting about him. A cultural leader in Northern Uganda is quoted by 
the Refugee Law Project Working Paper, 2005, giving his sentiments about Kony: 
Kony being convicted and taking him to The Hague, that is taking him to heaven. His cell 
will have air-conditioning, with a TV, he will be eating chicken and beef. He will be given 
a chance to work in jail and earn something. I’d rather he be here and see what he has 
done. Let him talk to the person he has ordered his lips to be cut off. Let him talk and 
hear. The Acholi mechanism must be allowed to run their course first, so that peace can 
be brought about. Only at that stage if there is a complainant who wants to take Kony to 
court should legal action be taken.  
This kind of sentiment is echoed by many people in Northern Uganda. The LRA should be made 
to see and acknowledge the harm that it has brought to its own people. Only after this 




acknowledgement has been done, forgiveness asked, reconciliation sought and compensation 
paid to its victims, will its elements be re-integrated back into the community. 
One major reason some people in Northern Uganda are opposed to the ICC involvement is 
because it threatened the Juba Peace talks. LRA leaders were reluctant to participate in 
negotiations while facing the prospect of criminal persecution in the international court. The 
Ugandan government promised to pursue the revocation of the ICC indictments after reaching 
a comprehensive peace agreement, but the LRA demands stronger assurance. At this rate, the 
traditional justice system seems like a viable alternative. 
The people of Northern Uganda have suffered for so long during this conflict where both the 
Ugandan government and the LRA need to share the blame though in different proportions. 
The Ugandan government is particularly criticized for having failed to protect the Acholi from 
the rebels that indiscriminately committed atrocities against them. Any peace or justice system 
that is pursued in Northern Uganda should seek to empower the local people. A strong 
argument in favor of traditional justice mechanism is that it would provide an opportunity for 
the people to revive their cultural beliefs that have eroded through the years. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE TRADITIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
While the Acholi traditional judicial system is more sensitive to the complex situation in 
Northern Uganda, they do not meet international justice standards that could be acceptable by 
the international community. 




As a limitation of the traditional justice system is that some individuals including women and 
girls are excluded in many important decision making processes. Important to point out is that 
the conflict in Northern Uganda has severely affected women as they have been raped and 
used as sex slaves, so a justice system that does not include them at every level does them a 
disservice.  
The youth which is another group that has been affect by the war has little knowledge of the 
tradition justice system. One reason for this has been because they have been on the move 
dealing with armed conflict and have missed out on learning about the traditional elements of 
their society. Yet, they were targeted and abducted as child soldiers and any justice system 
needs to put that into perspective. 
Then, there is also the cultural conflict of the Christians in Northern Uganda, who think that 
traditional processes and ceremonies are satanic as they go against the teachings of Christianity. 
There has been a loss of confidence in the elders in Northern Uganda who are supposed to be 
the pillars of the community. The conflict has exposed some of them as corrupt who have 
profited off the war and even derailed it. Steps must be taken to restore community confidence 
in the leaders’ integrity and ability. Leaders should strive to be as transparent as possible. 
Since the war in Northern Uganda has been a violation of International Human Law, it becomes 
imperative for institutions that deal with International Law such as the ICC to be involved. 
Crimes committed by the LRA are crimes against the entire international community which the 
Acholi tradition approach alone is not sufficient to deal with. The international community will 




demand accountability. For perpetrators to drink the bitter root and be forgiven and reconciled 
with their community is not enough. The international community is in favor of a justice system 
that spells out a proper punishment for the offenders that will discourage other people from 
committing crimes with impunity. 
Ex-combatants face difficulties such as resentment and stigmization. This is after they have 
gone through a traditional ceremony that guarantees them that they have been forgiven. They 
are still called killers and looked at with suspicion. This leads to returnees to think that the 
traditional judicial process of forgiveness and reconciliation is superficial. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
EVALUATION 
There is no doubt that in northern Uganda there are ambiguities about allocation of blame. It is 
possible that the issuing of arrest warrants increased military activity putting more children in 
danger. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the LRA might make children perform atrocities 
precisely because they are immune from persecution under the Rome Statute. It is the case 
that the long-term safety of witnesses and their families cannot be guaranteed, and the LRA 
commanders might choose to kill children and adults who they abducted, and who might at 
some time be asked to testify.  
The arrest warrants were issued at a time when the conflict was still going on and this should 
be seriously examined. It would be helpful if the ICC would confirm that children would not be 




used as witnesses during any prosecution. The ICC should also clarify how it will protect 
children who are current members of the LRA or children who are affected by the conflict 
generally and what effective mechanism is in place to protect witnesses. 
Regarding the plight of children in northern Uganda, the case of Dominic Ongwen is rather 
troubling. He is an indicted war criminal and a former child soldier, abducted by the LRA when 
he was 10 years of age. Ongwen’s moral development and choices must be contextualized 
within the rebel group’s organizational structure, norms, and beliefs. Ongwen’s actions may 
have been his own but they were certainly conditioned by his past experience as a victim. That 
said, the ICC may have been incorrect in identifying Ongwen as one of the LRA leaders that 
needed to be issued with an arrest warrant.  
It would be appropriate for child protection agencies and other concerned parties to focus on 
the repeated emphasis in the Rome Statute on acting in the ‘interests of justice’ and ‘acting in 
‘the interests of the victims’. These terms constrain the actions of the ICC in important ways 
and suggest an area dialogue and discussion.  
By issuing arrest warrants in on-going or recently settled conflicts, the court risks prolonging 
violence or endangering fragile peace processes. By removing the possibility of amnesty from 
the negotiating table, the ICC may remove incentives for settlements while encouraging 
perpetrators to remain in power in order to shield themselves from prosecution. 
Concerns about the principles of justice and peace are particularly prominent in connection 
with the Lord’s Resistance Army, Darfur and more recently Kenya. An argument can be made 




that ICC arrest warrants against the LRA commanders acted as an impediment to achieving a 
final peace agreement to the conflict. The community elders in northern Uganda are of the 
view that traditional reconciliation mechanisms should be employed instead of international 
prosecution. On the other hand, an argument can be made that the threat of ICC prosecution 
could serve as an important ingredient in a political solution. This discussion is valid because 
senior LRA commanders are no longer in northern Uganda and have sought refuge instead in 
neighboring countries. 
The people of northern Uganda should have a right to self- determination, and this implies the 
primary prerogative of determining how to end the conflict in northern Uganda. If they decide 
that the best way to deal with their past is to forgive all those who have committed crimes 
against civilians, that wish should be respected by others including the ICC. If they decide that 
those who are responsible for the violation of human rights should be dealt with in accordance 
with their own traditions that too has to be respected by all who do not share the values of the 
people affected. To impose on them an approach that negates prospects of ending the conflict 
and addressing its root causes primarily because we want to punish impunity is a violation of 
the peoples’ right to self-determination. 
Struggling with confidence issues on the African continent, the court needs to market itself 
anew. The ICC should send its judges even to those countries not currently under investigation 
to explain itself. There should be an effort to work with national courts to make the ICC’s work 
more familiar. 




More important, national judicial systems must be strengthened so that African countries can 
do the ICC’s job themselves. After all, the ICC is meant to be a court of last resort. It intervenes 
in Africa so much mainly because African countries have been unable or unwilling to handle 
complex and costly trials themselves. 
In order for the ICC to develop legitimacy in dealing with international justice issues it must be 
viewed as a neutral and independent body. In this respect, the court must ensure, to the 
greatest extent possible, objectivity and transparency in the selection of cases by the 
prosecutor. For the ICC to establish and retain legitimacy, it must investigate all parties of 
possible human rights violations, including those committed by the Uganda Peoples’ Defense 
Forces. 
 A lot has been said about the ICC being biased in favor of governments, that it exacerbates the 
violence, and that it interferes with the peace process. There are indeed reasons to believe so, 
but some of the arguments are misplaced. The ICC has had a useful role to play and is currently 
having positive effects. Most important, the activities of the ICC have not led to the worsening 
of the situation in northern Uganda that many commentators predicted. The number of 
abductions and killings has declined since the massacres of May 2004. 
The ICC has shaken up things in potentially positive ways. The whole system of population 
displacement into camps, which has both caused extraordinary suffering and even failed to 
provide adequate protection, can only be maintained with donor assistance. The situation is 
partly a product of well-meant aid from sensible humanitarian agencies. The success in 




effectively absorbing development finance has, in this part of the country, drawn international 
organizations into long term, institutionalized arrangements with anti-insurgency strategies. 
The ICC intervention has also played a part in directing wider international attention at the 
crisis. Suddenly, all sorts of new resources have become available for peace negotiations and 
longer-term development schemes. There are doubtless other reasons for these initiatives too, 
but the ICC has contributed. It has kept northern Uganda in the news with related statements 
prompting the UPDF to take the security of the camps seriously. 
On the other hand, by intervening in the northern Uganda conflict, the ICC helped perpetuate 
the conflict. To start war crime investigations for the sake of justice at a time when northern 
Uganda was at the brink of the most promising signs for a negotiated settlement must have 
helped to derail the conflict. The prospects of being convicted of war crimes drove the LRA 
away from the peace talks with the Uganda government. It is ironical that the ICC’s intention 
was to discourage impunity but it took steps that pushed the LRA back to the bush and led to 
the continuation of atrocities. 
The government of Uganda also deserves to share the blame for the suffering of the people in 
northern Uganda. The government failed to protect the people from the attacks of the LRA and 
heaped them in camps where the LRA still found them and massacred them. A better job at 
protecting the people should surely have been done. The President of Uganda did not act on 
the rampant corruption committed by some officials of the Uganda Peoples’ Defense Forces. It 
is believed that some officials would not like to see the conflict come to an end because they 




have and continue to profit from it massively. The President is aware of this, it was widely 
known that some officials of the UPDF created ghost soldiers and that funds that were meant to 
train and equip the army ended up in private bank accounts. The President has also kept a deaf 
ear to the crimes committed by his own forces against the people of northern Uganda. While it 
is the government that referred the crimes of the LRA to the ICC, the President used the referral 
to clean up his image to the international community, and sought to discard the ICC by asking 
for a withdrawal of the arrest warrants issued for the top five leaders of the LRA, and by 
offering promises of amnesty to the LRA. 
The conflict in northern Uganda raises complex issues that were not envisaged by the creators 
of the International Criminal Court. When they decided to investigate the crimes of the LRA, the 
greater emphasis should have been placed on the need for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. 
In order to ensure that criminal prosecutions do not undermine other initiatives to achieve 
peace, prosecutions should run parallel to steps taken at the community level. Otherwise, the 
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